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Abstract: This paper discusses research carried-out on the development and validation (on real plant) of 
a parity-equation based fault detection and isolation (FDI) system for a pneumatic actuator. A 
mechanistic model of the system is developed and validated in order to derive suitable parity equations 
for the pneumatic actuation system.  The parity equations are then formulated and used to generate 
residuals that, in turn, are analysed to determine whether faults are present in the system.  Details of the 
design process are given and the experimental results demonstrate that the approach can successfully 
detect and isolate faults associated with the sensors, actuators (servo-valves and piping) and the 
pneumatic cylinder itself.  The work is part of a BAE SYSTEMS’ sponsored project to demonstrate 
advanced control and diagnosis concepts on a Stewart-Gough platform. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The design of schemes for the detection and diagnosis of 
faults is becoming increasingly important in engineering due 
to the complexity of modern industrial systems and growing 
demands for quality, cost efficiency, reliability, and more 
importantly the safety issue (Al-Najjar, 1996). In industrial 
plant, early detection of developing faults can allow planned 
maintenance work to take place before a system 
malfunctions, possibly causing damage, or complete shut-
down of the system/plant.  This improves the level of plant 
safety, and increases the plant availability and profitability.  
In safety/mission critical applications, fault detection can be 
combined with reconfiguration (after a fault) to achieve fault 
tolerant control - allowing the system to complete its function 
in a way that is sub-optimal but does achieve the design 
objective.   
There two principal approaches to detection and isolation of 
faults:  
 Hardware redundancy - this involves comparing the 
outputs of identical hardware (sensors/actuators) and 
performing consistency cross-checks.  
 Analytical redundancy – combining sensor signals, 
control signals and models to arrive at estimates of 
unmeasured/immeasurable variables. 
Model-based Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) uses the 
principles of analytical redundancy to first detect deviations 
from normal behaviour in a system, and then to isolate the 
particular component that has a fault. Typically, model-based 
analytical estimates are compared with measured variables to 
generate residuals.  The residuals will be zero when the 
system is operating normally and will be non-zero when a 
fault arises.  There are a number of approaches to model- 
based residual generation. For example, observer-based 
approaches including Kalman Filters (Frank, 1990), parity 
 
relations approaches (Gertler and Singer, 1990) and 
parameter estimation (Patton et al 2000), Isermann, (1997).  
Useful surveys of these and other useful FDI methods can be 
found in Patton (1997), Iserman (1984), Willsky (1976), and 
Venkatasubramaniam et al (2003). However, most of the 
fault tolerant literature available deals with systems in a 
purely theoretical way or uses simulations to demonstrate the 
methods. Although many of the concepts work well in 
theory, it is clear that there have been limited real industrial 
applications particularly of the more advanced techniques. 
 
Fig. 1. Single pneumatic actuator test-rig 
The work described in this paper is part of an on going 
project which aims to demonstrate FDI as part of a fault 
tolerant control system on a Stewart-Gough platform 
comprising six pneumatic actuators.  The first phase of the 
work has focussed on modelling, control and FDI applied to a 
single actuator (see figure 1).   
This paper reports results obtained from experiments on the 
rig using the parity equation approach to FDI.  The paper is 
organised as follows, in section 2 the experimental set-up is 
  
     
 
described; section 3 summarises the mathematical model of 
the pneumatic system (including validation results), which is 
used as the foundation of the control and FDI design; section 
4 describes the FDI approach and how the parity equations 
are applied to the pneumatic system; section 5 presents and 
discusses the results for the four different fault cases; finally, 
conclusions are drawn and future work is discussed in section 
6.       
2. EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP 
The experimental set-up is illustrated in Figure 2. The set-up 
shows the xPC Target coupled with Matlab/Simulink®, 
which provides a real-time environment. A host and a target 
computer are connected using a TCP/IP network. 
Matlab/Simulink® is run on the host computer, this is where 
the control and FDI system is designed using xPC target I/O 
blocks. Using external mode the system file is built and 
compiled within the host computer. Then downloaded to the 
target computer where it is executed using the real-time 
kernel. The position signal is measured via a Linear Resistive 
Transducer (LRT) mounted in the cylinder rear section. The 
acceleration signal is acquired using an accelerometer 
mounted on the end of the piston rod. 
Fig. 2. Schematic of experimental set-up 
3. MODELLING OF PNUEMATIC SYSTEM 
 
An early attempt to analyse pneumatic control systems was 
reported by Shearer (1956). This was further extended by 
Burrows (1969), and Scavarda et al (1987). One of the main 
problems in pneumatic actuator position control is the highly 
non-linear equations that model the system. This means that 
classical linear controller synthesis methods difficult to 
apply. Moreover, due to the non-linearity, the parameters of 
these equations are usually very difficult to identify. 
However, using approximation of the model, allows the use 
of a restricted range of the optimum parameters that are 
selected with classical methods (Chillari et al, 2001). For a 
detailed description of the mathematical model of the 
pneumatic system see Grewal et al (2008). The pneumatic 
circuit to be modelled is depicted in Figure 3. 
 
3.1. Pneumatic Model 
The relationship between the air mass flow and the pressure 
 
Fig. 3.  Schematic of the double acting cylinder. 
 
changes in the chambers is obtained using energy 
conservation laws (first law of thermodynamics), and the 
force equilibrium is given by Newton’s second law. Where M 
is the piston mass, A is the bore area, Pp is the pressure in 
chamber p, Pn is the pressure in chamber n, Vp is the air 
volume in chamber p, Vn is the air volume in chamber in n, Ts 
is the operating temperature, 
pm& is the mass flow rate into 
chamber p, and 
nm& is the mass flow rate into chamber n. The 
relationship between the mass flow rate of air and the change 
of both pressure and volume in chambers can be written as: 
                                     
                                                                          
(1) 
                                     
                                     
                (2) 
 
Where, γ is the ratio of specific heat, R is the universal gas 
constant. The dynamics of the cylinder motion can be 
described by: 
                    ( ) PAPPAxFxM npf ∆=−=+ &&&                    (3) 
Where x is the position of the piston, Ff represents the viscous 
friction coefficient and coulomb friction force. The mass flow 
rate is identical (in magnitude) for both chambers and is 
proportional to the valve input voltage (v). Hence 
 
                         (4) 
                 
Where K is the servo valve constant (Kg.s-1.v-1) determined 
from the valve's data-sheet. With the assumption of 
incompressibility the rate of change of volumes can be 
written as 
       xAVandxAV np &
&&& −==                             (5) 
Substituting equation (4) and (5) into equations (1) and (2), 
then rearranging the equations for chambers p and n gives:          
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Then rearranging equation (3) gives: 
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The overall model makes use of equations (6), (7), and (8) 
implemented either in state-space or block diagram form (in, 
e.g. Matlab/Simulink).  
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3.2. Model validation 
 
In order to validate the model a number of experiments were 
carried out on the open-loop actuator and the results 
compared with those from simulation. A typical set of results 
for a square wave input is shown in Figure 4.  Here, the 
square wave input is set at 0.6 volts and the frequency set at 
0.5Hz, and the position and the pressure output responses are 
plotted alongside those predicted by the model. The periodic 
step input is used because a step has all frequencies of 
interest present (so should excite all the key dynamics). The 
simulation results show reasonable agreement with those 
from the experiment. The position results show a particularly 
good match, whilst those for the two cylinders pressures 
capture the dominant response, though there is clearly some 
longer-term mode that is not represented in the model. These 
differences are thought to be due to non-linearities associated 
with pneumatic systems that are not captured in the model. 
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Fig. 4. The comparisons between the system and model outputs 
for a square wave input. 
4. DESIGN OF THE FDI SCHEME 
 
4.1 FDI Approach 
 
Figure 5 shows the generic structure of the model-based fault 
detection scheme. The method consists of detecting faults on 
the process, which includes actuators, components and 
sensors, based on measuring the input signal U(t) and the 
output signal Y(t). The detection method uses models to 
generate residuals R(t). The residual evaluation examines the 
residuals for the likehood of faults and a decision rule is 
applied to determine if faults have occurred. Referring to the 
pneumatic system depicted in Figure 1 (and with reference to 
Figure 5) the proportional valve would be described as the 
actuator and the pneumatic cylinder would be described as 
the plant. The sensors are self-evident.  
 
4.2. The Parity Equation Method 
 
The parity equation method was proposed by Chow and 
Willsky, (1984) using the redundancy relations of the 
dynamic system. The basic idea is to provide a proper check 
of the parity (consistency) of the measurements for the  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Conceptual structure of FDI scheme 
 
monitored system. Parity equations are rearranged and 
usually transformed variants of the input-output or space-
state models of the system (Venkatasubramaniam et al 2003). 
In effect this means making use of known mathematical 
models that describe the relationships between system 
variables.  In theory, under normal operating conditions, the 
residual or value of the parity equations is zero. However, in 
real situations the residuals will be nonzero. This is due to 
measurement and process noise, model inaccuracies, errors in 
sensors and actuators, including faults in plants. The idea of 
the parity approach is to rearrange the model structure to 
achieve the best fault isolation (i.e. so that the effect of faults 
is far greater than that of the other uncertainties). The residual 
generator scheme used hereafter is based on a classical 
model-based methodology using the parity space approach. 
The desired properties for the residual signal r(t) are r(t) ≠ 0 
if f  f(t) ≠ 0.Where r is the residual and f is the fault. The 
residual is generated based on the information provided by 
the system input and output signals using a residual 
generation (Patton and Chen, 1997). Figure 6 shows the 
pneumatic control loop scheme, which contains the following 
elements: The controller C(s), the proportional valve GA(s), 
the pneumatic actuator GP(s), and the sensor GS(s). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Pneumatic closed loop scheme with additive faults 
 
The actuator fault Fa(s) and the sensor fault FS(s) can have 
dynamics which are modelled by the transfer functions Ha(s), 
and HS(s). In addition to the position (feedback) sensor, 
pressure sensors are included in the system to read pressure 
from each chamber of the actuator. These are not included in 
the closed loop control system, but may be used for fault 
detection, and are shown as Pp(s) and Pn(s) respectively. 
With the pressure sensor faults shown as FPp(s) and FPn(s). 
The pressure sensor faults are modelled by the transfer 
  
     
 
functions HPp(s) and HPn(s). Using the description of the 
system shown in Figure 6 the following relationships can be 
derived. This method of parity equations is taken from 
Biakeche et al (1994). 
 
XS(s)=[GS(s)+HS(s)FS(s)][GP(s)GA(s)U(s)+Ha(s)Fa(s)](9)               
                         
Pnact=[U(s)GP(s)+Ha(s)Fa(s)][Pn(s)+HPn(s)FPn(s)]    (10)  
                                        
Ppact=[U(s)GP(s)+Ha(s)Fa(s)][Pp(s)+HPp(s)FPp(s)]    (11) 
 
                                U(s)=C(s)(V(s)-XS(s))                        (12) 
Equation (12) is an analytical redundancy relation and 
implies the assumption that all signals are available for 
measurement. However, in reality for an industrial 
application the controller signal U(s) is not usually measured. 
Using equations (9) to (12) the following residuals can be 
formulated: 
R1=XS(s)-GS(s)GP(s)GA(s)U(s)=HS(s)FS(s)+HaFa(s)    (14)       
                                                                                                    
R2= Pnact - U(s)GA(s)Pn(s)=Ha(s)Fa(s)+HPn(s)FPn(s)  (15)  
               
R3= Ppact - U(s)GA(s)Pp(s)=Ha(s)Fa(s)+HPp(s)FPp(s)  (16) 
 
4.3. Residual Evaluation and Thresholds 
 
The purpose of residual evaluation is to generate a fault 
decision by processing the residuals. A fault decision is the 
result of all the tasks fault detection, isolation, and 
identification (Kiencke and Nielsen, 2005). Residual 
evaluation is essentially to check if the residual is responding 
to a fault. The residual evaluation can in its simplest form be 
a thresholding of the residual, i.e. a fault is assumed present if 
| Ri(t) | > Ji(t) where J(t) is the threshold, or moving averages 
of the residuals. Another method may consist of statistical 
sequential probability ratio testing (Patton et al, 2000). In the 
present case the residuals are processed to acquire the root 
mean square (RMS) of the value over a moving window of N 
samples (Dixon, 2004) as shown: 
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Where Ri(k) is the value of the residual at the kth sample. 
Subsequently, the residual RMS value is compared with a 
predetermined fault detection threshold. The thresholds for 
the system have been set such that if the fault applied causes 
a decrease in performance of 20% then a fault flag is fired. 
Table 1 shows the fault signatures of the pneumatic system 
for different single faults. These are identified by inspection 
from Figure 6 and the combination of faults flags can be used 
to isolate faults. 
 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
In order to demonstrate the FDI scheme using parity 
equations a number of experiments were carried out on the 
pneumatic system (Figures 1 and 2). The considered faults  
Table 1.  Fault signatures with additive faults 
 
 
for this study are nonparametric faults or additive faults and a 
drift fault. These are unknown inputs acting on the plant. The 
occurrence of a fault is modelled by a nonzero output. This 
affect causes a change in the plant outputs independent of the 
known inputs. The pneumatic process GA(s) and GP(s) is 
modelled by the equations (6), (7) and (8). The sensor 
dynamics are assumed to be instantaneous i.e. Ha(s), HS(s), 
HPn(s), HPp(s), Pn(s), Pp(s), and GS(s) =1. The system is 
operated under position control with a PI controller designed 
to give appropriate closed-loop performance. The fault 
scenarios considered are summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Fault characteristics 
 
 
5.1. Actuator fault 
 
An additive fault Fa(s) (see Fig.6) is applied to the 
proportional valve. A step reduction on Fa(s) simulates a 
fault in the proportional control valve. This could be due to a 
fault in the power supply, amplifier or the connection 
between the control signal and the valve. Figure 8 shows the 
time history of this experiment. Where plot (8a) shows the 
actual system output (with fault); plots 8b, 8c, and 8d show 
the RMS values of the actuator residuals R1, R2, and R3 
respectively. The state of the actuator fault flag is shown in 
the lower plot (8e). At 30s the fault occurs, for a period of 
0.5s then clears. The fault is detected within 0.5ms. The fault 
flag is fired within 1.5ms and remains fired until the fault is 
removed from the system and subsequently, at 30.86s the 
fault flag returns to the false state when the RMS value falls 
below the threshold. These results concur with the fault 
signatures detailed in Table 1. 
 
5.2. Pressure sensor (Pn) fault 
 
For an additive fault (FPn) applied to the pressure sensor of 
chamber n. Figure 9 shows the time history of this 
experiment. The applied fault emulates that there is a 
decrease of pressure in the pressure signal from the sensor; in 
practice this could be due to a faulty connection or a faulty 
sensor. The upper plot shows the actual pressure sensor 
output (with fault); the middle plot shows the state of the 
plant fault flag; and the RMS value of the pressure sensor 
residual R2 is shown in the lower plot. At 25s the fault occurs, 
for a period of 2.5s then clears. The fault is detected within 
Residual Actuator  Pressure 
sensor Pn  
Pressure 
sensor Pp 
Position 
sensor  
     R1 1 0 0 1 
     R2 1 1 0 0 
     R3 1 0 1 0 
Test Fault Time of  
appearance 
Duration Magnitude 
1 Actuator Fa(s) 30 sec 0.5 sec -5v 
2 Pressure sensor  FPn(s) 25 sec 2.5 sec -0.5bar 
3 Pressure sensor  FPp(s) 20 sec 2.5 sec -0.5bar 
4 Position sensor   FS(s) 17 sec 10 sec 2 (slope)  
  
     
 
Time (s) 
0.5 ms. The fault flag is fired within 1.5ms and remains fired 
until the fault is removed from the system and subsequently, 
at 27.65s the fault flag returns to the false state when the 
RMS value falls below the threshold. 
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Fig. 8. Actuator fault Fa (s) results- actual plant output (8a), 
the residual evaluation function outputs (8b, 8c, and 8d), 
actuator fault flag (8e)   
 
5.3. Pressure sensor (Pp) fault 
 
Figure 10 shows the time history of this experiment for an 
additive fault (FPp) applied to the pressure sensor of chamber 
n. The applied fault emulates there is a decrease of pressure 
in the pressure signal (faulty sensor). The upper plot shows 
the actual pressure sensor output (with fault); the middle plot 
shows the state of the plant fault flag; and the RMS value of 
the pressure sensor residual R3 is shown in the lower plot. At 
20s the fault occurs, for a period of 2.5s then clears. The fault 
is detected within 0.5ms. The fault flag is fired within 1.5ms 
and remains fired until the fault is removed from the system 
and subsequently, at 22.65s the fault flag returns to the false 
state when the RMS value falls below the threshold.  
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Fig. 9. Pressure sensor Pn fault FPn (s) results- showing time 
history of pressure sensor output (top), sensor fault flag 
(middle), the residual evaluation function output (lower)  
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Fig. 10. Pressure sensor Pp fault FPp (s) results- showing 
time history of pressure sensor output (top), sensor fault flag 
(middle), the residual evaluation function output (lower). 
 
5.4. Position sensor (GS) drift fault 
 
Harsh working conditions along with the gradual build up of 
dirt on the sensor and faulty circuitry can cause the effect of 
sensor output drift. From Figure 11, at 17s a drift bias (FS) is 
added to the position signal. Although sensor drift can be a 
slow process i.e. possibly over a period of hours, for this 
work adding a drift bias within a period of approximately 10s 
has accelerated the effect of sensor drift. This is so the fault 
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can be detected and isolated without running the experiment 
for long periods. From the RMS residual R1 the drift fault is 
detected at 17.5s and the fault flag is raised within 0.6ms. 
The RMS residuals R2 and R3 do not activate/cross their 
respective thresholds. Again, these results concur with the 
fault signatures detailed in Table 1. 
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Fig. 11. Position sensor fault - actual plant output-position 
sensor R1 (top), Pressure sensor (Pn) R2 (middle), Pressure 
sensor (Pp) R3 (lower)   
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The paper has described application of a parity equation 
approach to fault detection in a closed loop pneumatic 
positioning system. The pneumatic system model has been 
formulated and typical validation results have been presented. 
Parity equations have been used to generate residuals and 
these have been compared to suitable thresholds in order to 
check the parity (consistency) of the measurements for the 
monitored system. Nonparametric (additive) faults have been 
assumed in formulating the equations and have then been 
applied experimentally to test the efficacy of the detection 
system.  
The results show that, using the described parity equation 
method, fault detection was possible from the available 
measurements. Faults in the actuator can be isolated along 
with the various sensor faults, with position and pressure 
sensor faults being successfully detected. The test results 
agree with the fault signatures detailed in Table 1.   
An important reason for selecting the parity equation residual 
generation method was the relative simplicity of the layout 
and application of the model equations.  It has been shown 
that despite this simplicity the approach can be used 
effectively for a real plant with non-linear behaviour.  Future 
work will be focussed on other model-based residual 
generation schemes. 
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